Sank's Glossary of Linguistics
Idiom-Imo |
IDIOM
- (Grammar) Perhaps it is better to use the term complex unit for those expressions that would be assigned the term idiom by most of the contributors to this volume. In fact, the term complex unit expresses the common ground for the expressions that form the topic of the current volume. In one sense they are complex in that they consist of more than one word; in some other sense they are units. From a broader perspective, all authors in this volume agree that these complex units are syntactic expressions that exhibit lexical co-occurrence restrictions that cannot be explained in terms of regular rule-governed syntactic or semantic restrictions. The fact that kick the bucket means 'die' does not follow from any underlying principle or from our knowledge of the world. The fact that we have to say spill the beans and not spill the peas does not follow from any grammatical rule but simply has to be learned, even if we assume that this idiom is semantically compositional or analyzable. This means that, in a sense, one could say that idioms are idioms by convention. Like all conventions, idioms have to be explicitly learned and remembered. Of course, there are limits to what can constitute an idiom. Often these limitations are invoked by grammatical principles, but sometimes idioms are restricted in form because of extralinguistic factors. So we can say that the topic of this book is conventionalized complex expressions. | Martin Everaert, Erik-Jan van der Linden, Andre Schenk, and Rob Schreuder, editors, 1995
- (Grammar) What constitutes an idiom is a very important yet difficult initial question for all those interested in the study of idioms, including those in the business of learning or teaching idioms (Cornell 1999, Fernando 1978, 1996, Grant and
Bauer 2004, Liu 2003, Moon 1998, Tabossi and Zardon 1993, M. M. Wood
1981). A fairly extensive reading of publications on idioms will reveal that the definition of idiom often varies considerably from scholar to scholar. For some scholars, and in a broad sense, the term is rather inclusive, covering, among other things, all fixed phrases, clichés, formulaic speeches, proverbs, slang expressions, and, at the extreme, even single polysemic words. For example, Cooper (1998), Hockett (1958), and Katz and Postal (1963) have included as idioms individual words, especially those used metaphorically such as the word weigh in the phrase weigh a decision. Yet for other scholars, and in a more restrictive use, idiom is a much narrower term,
referring only to those "fixed and semantically opaque or metaphorical"
expressions such as kick the bucket or spill the beans (Moon 1998); for a very few, the concept of idiom even excludes metaphorical idiomatic expressions (Grant and Bauer 2004). Confronted with these diverse definitions
of idiom, one will have to agree with Moon (1998) that "[i]diom is an ambiguous term, used in conflicting ways". What makes the term ambiguous is, of course, the fact that idioms are "multifaceted objects" that are "not only complex, but also in many ways elusive" (Tabossi and Zardon 1993). For such a complex and elusive concept, perhaps no single
definition can be adequate or even possible, certainly not for scholars whose
research interests vary significantly. | Dilin Liu, 2008
- (Examples)
Most Frequently Used Idioms in Each of Three Corpora of Spoken American English
(In Order of Frequency)
• Corpus of Spoken, Professional American English (Barlow 2000): in terms of, deal with, sort of, kind of, in fact, make sure, go on, of course, as well, come up, go through, at all, as well as, look for, with/in respect to, get into, come up with, in other words, find out, first of all, in order to/that, take (the) place (of), in a/some way, as/so far as, figure out, be (have something) in place, ...
• Spoken American Media English (Liu 2002): kind of, of course, in fact, deal with, at all, sort of, as well, come up, find out, look for, go on, go through, according to, go ahead, make sure, in a/some way, in terms of, as well as, put on, first of all, by the way, pick up, so far, call for, point out, end up, get into, take care of, as (so) far as, come up with, turn out, in order to/that, ...
• Michigan Corpus of Academic Spoken English (Simpson, Briggs, Ovens, and Swales 2002): kind of, go on, of course, in terms of, in fact, go through, at all, as well, deal with, make sure, in order to/that, figure out, look for, end up, make sense, in other words, get into, come up with, in a/any sense of/that, find out, turn out, in a/some way, come up, first of all, as/so far as, set up, used to (+ verb), go over, go ahead, put on, in general, according to, pick up, by the way, ...
| Dilin Liu, 2003
- (Grammar) Yakov Malkiel in his "Studies in Irreversible Binomials" (1959) actually warns:
One does well to steer clear of any reference to the ill-defined category of idioms, or phraseological formulas. These have been variously spoken of as:
- Sequences yielding imperfectly to routine grammatical analysis.
- Passages strikingly rebellious to literal translation (this phrasing manifests a simultaneous concern with more than one language).
- Semi-autonomous pieces of congealed syntax (a view implying the supremacy of the historical perspective).
- Word groups whose aggregate meaning cannot be fully predicted even from a thorough knowledge of each ingredient (a semantic approach).
- In stylistic or aesthetic terms, as clichés, i.e., as combinations once suffused with fresh metaphoric vigor but gradually worn thin by dint of use.
| Adam Makkai, 1969
IDIOM PRINCIPLE
(Psycholinguistics) Multi-word expressions (MWEs) have been studied extensively by theoretical, applied, and corpus linguists. Thus, we have a notion of what the different types of MWEs are and even (roughly) how frequently they occur in language. However, relatively little empirical research has been done on on-line processing (processing happening in real time) of MWEs. It has been found that language users notice, learn, and store frequency and predictability information that is encoded in phrasal units (Bannard and Matthews 2008, Arnon and Snider 2010, Siyanova-Chanturia et al. 2011). It has been hypothesized that this is because it is easier and more economic to remember and use language in chunks rather than as a combination of single words (Wray 2002). Sinclair (1991) was one of the first to theorize on this phenomenon, in what he referred to as the Idiom Principle:
The principle of idiom is that a language user has available to him or her a large number of semi-preconstructed phrases that constitute
single choices, even though they might appear to be analyzable into segments.
| Anna Siyanova-Chanturia and Ron Martinez, 2014
See Also MULTI-WORD EXPRESSION.
IDIOMATICITY
- (Grammar; Phraseology) As useful and powerful as the atomistic schema is for the description of linguistic competence, it doesn't allow the grammarian to account for absolutely everything in its terms. As anyone knows who has worked with practical grammar-writing or with detailed text analysis, the descriptive linguist needs to append to this maximally general machinery certain kinds of special knowledge—knowledge that will account for speakers' ability to construct and understand phrases and expressions in their language which are not covered by the grammar, the lexicon, and the principles of compositional semantics, as these are familiarly conceived. Such a list of exceptional phenomena contains things which are larger than words, which are like words in that they have to be learned separately as individual whole facts about pieces of the language, but which also have grammatical structure, structure of the kind that we ordinarily interpret by appealing to the operation of the general grammatical rules. This list is not merely a supplement to the lexicon: it contains information about fully productive grammatical patterns, including what have been variously referred to as minor sentence types, special constructions, and the like.
We think of a locution or manner of speaking as idiomatic if it is assigned an interpretation by the speech community but if somebody who merely knew the grammar and the vocabulary of the language could not, by virtue of that knowledge alone, know (i) how to say it, or (ii) what it means, or (iii) whether it is a conventional thing to say. Put differently, an idiomatic expression or construction is something a language user could fail to know while knowing everything else in the language. | Charles J. Fillmore, Paul Kay, and Mary Catherine O'Connor, 1988
- (Grammar; Semiotics) If it is conceived in a broader way, it can be defined as the creation of new signs by gathering several pre-existing elements, and attributing a new meaning to the whole (cf. Timofeeva 2012). This is a general semiotic mechanism that affects virtually all the levels of the system, not only the phraseological one. For example, in English spelling, the function of the grapheme <sh> represents a single phoneme (/š/) with two letters whose function is different when they are not together (<s>, <h>). In morpho-syntax, the analytic tenses are based on this principle, if compared with synthetic tenses. Conjugations such as I have read; I was reading enhance the verbal system joining two words whose function is not the same when they are alone. This type of grammatical non-compositionality can be considered as a case of functional idiomaticity. | Antonio Pamies-Bertrán, 2017
- (Grammar; Phraseology) I will offer the following two definitions of idiomaticity:
- Nativelike selection of expression. (inspired by Pawley and Syder 1983)
- That which one has to know over and above rules and words. (inspired by Fillmore et al 1988)
The latter definition breaks with the traditional view that knowing a language involves two types of knowledge: rules and lexical items—period. Although it is common knowledge that there is more to knowledge of a language than dictionary items and syntax, Fillmore's suggestion nevertheless represents a breakthrough in linguistic theory. Surprisingly, the fact is that it is only in the last few decades that we have we seen this insight empirically demonstrated and theoretically accounted for. In this connection it should perhaps be pointed out that we must distinguish between the study of idiomaticity and the study of idioms. Idioms in the sense 'opaque invariant word combinations' have been studied by theoretical linguists quite extensively, but these bona fide idioms do not contribute to the idiomaticity of a text in any important way. Presence of such idioms in a text does not necessarily make it idiomatic; nor does their absence make it unidiomatic. | Beatrice Warren, 2005
ILLEGAL BASE
(Example)
○ The output form of the base must be no longer than one syllable and end in an obstruent, optionally preceded by a sonorant (per Halle 1973). For example, soften is legal despite a seemingly
illegal base, because the final /t/ in the base is not present in the output [sɑfn̩]. | Ash Asudeh, Tina Bögel, and Dan Siddiqi, 2022
ILLOCUTIONARY ACT
- (Pragmatics) A concept introduced into linguistics by the philosopher J. L. Austin (1975) in his investigation of the various aspects of speech acts. In his framework, locution is what was said and meant; illocution is what was done; and perlocution is what happened as a result.
When somebody says Is there any salt? at the dinner table, the illocutionary act is a request: 'please give me some salt' even though the locutionary act (the literal sentence) was to ask a question about the presence of salt. The perlocutionary act (the actual effect) might be to cause somebody to pass the salt. | Wikipedia, 2024
- (Pragmatics) Like Austin I present a trichotomy, though with important differences. Mine looks like this:
- Sentential act—Uttering a sentence or some sentence surrogate.
- Illocutionary act—Uttering a sentence (or sentence surrogate) with a certain content, the sort of act paradigmatically reported by "indirect discourse", as in Jones asked where the nearest newsstand is.
- Perlocutionary act—Producing an effect on some audience by an utterance.
| William P. Alston, 2000
- (Pragmatics) It seems to me there are (at least) twelve significant dimensions of variation in which illocutionary acts differ one from another and I shall—all too briskly—list them:
- Differences in the point (or purpose) of the (type of) act.
- Differences in the direction of fit between words and the world.
- Differences in expressed psychological states.
- Differences in the force or strength with which the illocutionary
point is presented.
- Differences in the status or position of the speaker and hearer as
these bear on the illocutionary force of the utterance.
- Differences in the way the utterance relates to the interests of the
speaker and the hearer.
- Differences in relations to the rest of the discourse.
- Differences in propositional content that are determined by illocutionary-force indicating devices.
- Differences between those acts that must always be speech acts,
and those that can be, but need not be, performed as speech acts.
- Differences between those acts that require extra-linguistic institutions for their performance and those that do not.
- Differences between those acts where the corresponding illocutionary verb has a performative use and those where it does not.
- Differences in the style of performance of the illocutionary act.
| John R. Searle, 1975
ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE
- (Pragmatics) The speaker's intention in producing an utterance. An illocutionary act is an instance of a culturally defined speech act type, characterized by a particular illocutionary force; for example, promising, advising, warning, etc.
Thus, if a speaker asks How's that salad doing? Is it ready yet? as a way of ("politely") enquiring about the salad, his/her intent may be in fact to make the waiter bring the salad. Thus the illocutionary force of the utterance is not an inquiry about the progress of salad construction, but a demand that the salad be brought. | Harold F. Schiffman, ?
- (Pragmatics) Illocutionary force is the combination of
- the illocutionary point of an utterance, and
- the particular presuppositions and attitudes that must accompany that point, including the
- strength of the illocutionary point,
- preparatory conditions,
- propositional content conditions,
- mode of achievement,
- sincerity conditions, and
- strength of sincerity conditions.
Illocutionary force distinguishes the following types of acts:
- asserting,
- promising,
- excommunicating,
- exclaiming in pain,
- inquiring, and
- ordering.
(Crystal 1980, Searle and Vanderveken 1985) | SIL Glossary of Linguistic Terms, 2003
IMBRICATION
- (Morphology) The perfect verbal suffix in Bemba (Bantu; Zambia, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of Congo) functions as a tense aspect marker denoting a terminated action or the past-perfect tense. The function of the perfect suffix varies from language to language within the Bantu group but was mostly used to denote the terminative or perfect aspect in Proto-Bantu (Mould 1972). The peculiarity of the perfect suffix stems from the fact that apart from affixation to the end of the root or verbal base it can also be inserted within the verbal base, particularly systematically before the base final consonant. This process has been referred to in previous literature as formation of a modified base (Ashton et al. 1954, Givón 1970, Mould 1972), Fusion (de Blois 1975), or Imbrication (Bastin 1983, Hyman 1995). I therefore follow Bastin in adopting the term imbrication. I refer to the position in the base where the suffix is inserted as the imbrication site. | Nancy Chongo Kula, 2001
- (Morphology) A morphophonological change in many Bantu languages in which the morpheme -il- / -ir-, which may be glossed as perfective, stative or past (Hyman 1995), fuses with the verb stem (Bastin 1983), producing relatively opaque differences between input and output forms. Across Bantu, imbrication exhibits variation in its triggering environments. It involves the modification of the verb stem or root in different ways, depending on the language. Imbrication has posed descriptive and analytical challenges in terms of explaining why it takes place and accounting for the types of morphophonological changes it causes. | Carolyn Harford and Gloria Malambe, 2017
IMBRICATION REQUIREMENT
(Semantics; Syntax) Many complex sentences are ambiguous between an imbricational and an independent LF, but movement often disambiguates in favor of the imbricational LF. We call this the Imbrication Requirement: movement requires imbrication.
Imbrication Requirement
The head and foot of a chain formed by movement of a DP must be interpreted with respect to situations that stand in an imbricational requirement.
Intuitively, the Imbrication Requirement is a requirement that the head and foot of the chain pick out the same object—an object that uniquely satisfies the same description, in a closely related situation. Without the Imbrication Requirement, this isn't guaranteed, because nothing forces the situation variables in different links in the chain to be bound in this way. | Kenyon Branan and Rob Truswell, 2024
IMBRICATIONAL
(Semantics) Consider a sentence containing two heads X and Y, each introducing a situation variable, respectively sx and sy . In principle, these two variables could be interpreted independently of each other, in a logical form along the lines of (1). Of course, in a coherent discourse, there would be some indirect relation between sx and sy , established via times, worlds, or rhetorical relations, but no relation is directly established between the situation variables—there is no clause of the form R(sx,sy) in (1).
- ∃sx ∃sy ... ( P(...sx ...) ∧ Q(...sy ...) ∧ ... )
Alternatively, sx could be interpreted as part of sy, yielding a logical form like (2).
- ∃sx ∃sy ... ( P(...sx ...) ∧ Q(...sy ...) ∧ sx ⊑ sy ∧ ... )
In (2), a relation is established directly between sx and sy, using the part-of relation ⊑. We call this configuration imbricational, and that in (1) independent. | Kenyon Branan and Rob Truswell, 2024
IMBRICATIONAL INTERPRETATION
(Example)
○ Consider the interpretation of temporal adjuncts with when (parallel arguments can be made with after and before). When has two interpretations, an independent one which relates times and an imbricational one which relates situations. The imbricational interpretation is apparent in (1), from Moens and Steedman (1988): on this interpretation, there are apparently no purely temporal requirements imposed by when (the architect's plans precede the building, possibly by years; the using materials is part of the building; the solving the traffic problems follows the completion, possibly playing out over years). What is constant across these three examples is the imbricational relation holding between P and Q: (a–c) are interpreted as part of the building of the bridge.
- [When they built the 39th Street bridge], ...
a. a local architect drew up the plans.
b. they used the best materials.
c. they solved most of their traffic problems.
The independent interpretation of when can be forced by adding a measure phrase describing how precisely the situations described by P and Q overlap temporally. Examples are roughly, approximately, and exactly. Adding any of these measure phrases to (1) removes the imbricational reading, leaving an interpretation where P and Q
describe independent, temporally proximate situations. | Kenyon Branan and Rob Truswell, 2024
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