Sank's Glossary of Linguistics 
M-Meq

MACRO-EVENT PROPERTY

  1. (Semantics) How should linguistic event segmentation be measured? Previous studies have taken syntactic units (Pawley 1987) or intonational units (Givón 1991) as criteria. But such units are language-specific in terms of their internal complexity and therefore incomparable as measures of event segmentation. Our proposed starting point is the "Macro-Event Property" (MEP), a property of constructions that assesses the event construal they convey—specifically, the "tightness of packaging" of subevents in the construction. A construction has the MEP if temporal operations such as time adverbials, temporal clauses, and tenses necessarily have scope over all subevents encoded by the construction. | Jürgen Bohnemeyer, 2007
  2. (Semantics) An event-denoting construction has the Macro-Event Property iff it combines with those time-positional or durational operators that have scope over all sub-events it entails. (This is restricted to semantically and syntactically well-formed combinations of event-encoding constructions and temporal operators.) | Jürgen Bohnemeyer, 2007, 2011
  3. (Semantics) A property of construction types

    1. Floyd left Nijmegen at eight. He passed through Utrecht at nine and reached Amsterdam at ten.
    2. *Floyd went from Nijmegen at eight to Amsterdam at ten via Utrecht at nine.
    3. In the morning, Floyd went from Nijmegen to Amsterdam via Utrecht.
    Macro-Event Property (MEP) (Informal definition)
    An event-denoting construction has the MEP iff it combines only with those time-positional or durational modifiers that have scope over all subevents it entails.
    Denotation of time-positional modifiers
    AT := λP λt ∃e.P(e) & τ (e) ⊆ t
    The variable t ranges over time intervals and τ (e) is a "temporal trace" function that returns the "run time" of event e. AT maps an event e that falls under a predicate P into a time t which contains the run time of e. The value of t may be determined by some other event description (after breakfast; during Floyd's visit to Nijmegen; as she was heading down the driveway) or through specification of a calendrical time interval (in the morning; on Monday; at 3pm).
    Macro-Event Property (MEP) (Formal definition, for time-positional modifiers only):
    Let expression C denote an event predicate P. Let TPOS be any modifier of C ([...TPOS...]C) which locates some subevent e' ≤Ee at time t (TPOS ⇒ λQ λt ∃e [ Q(e') ∧ τ (e') ⊆ t ], where Q may or may not be identical to P). Then C has the MEP iff any syntactically and semantically acceptable TPOS necessarily also locates e at t (i.e., AT (Q, e', t) → AT (P, e, t) for any acceptable TPOS).
     | Jürgen Bohnemeyer and Robert D. Van Valen, Jr., 2009

MANDATORY CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE
(Pragmatics) In contrast with run-of-the-mill Quantity implicatures, an utterance of (unembedded) A or B will always trigger the implicature that the speaker had a reason to avoid an utterance of A and B—that is, this implicature arises mandatorily. The "ignorance" implicature of disjunction is mandatory in the sense that, whenever a speaker utters an unembedded disjunction, the hearer must infer a reason why he did not assert one of the disjuncts.
 Mandatory implicatures are fully expected on a Gricean conception of pragmatics, and they arise in the same way as optional ones. | Sven Lauer, 2014

MANNER ADVERB
(Grammar) An adverb that tells us how an action is or should be performed:

  1. She sang loudly in the bath.
  2. The sky quickly grew dark.
  3. They whispered softly.
  4. I had to run fast to catch the bus.
 | Internet Grammar of English, 1998

MARKED NOMINATIVE CASE SYSTEM

  1. (Grammar) The case system of Datooga, a Southern Nilotic dialect cluster of Northern and Central Tanzania, is of the "marked nominative" type, i.e., it is based on the opposition of a nominative case which encodes both the subject of an intransitive verb (S) and the subject of a transitive one (A) vs. an accusative case which encodes the object of a transitive verb (P). However, in contrast to prototypical nominative/accusative systems, it is the nominative case rather than the accusative which receives morphological marking in Datooga. This unusual marking pattern reflects an unusual division of labor between the case forms, the marked nominative being confined to the function of coding S and A in pragmatically neutral clauses, whereas the unmarked accusative or absolute takes over a wide range of functions apart from coding P, e.g., it characterizes the citation form, nouns in non-verbal predication and preverbal subjects. Thus, what at first glance appears as an odd and outlandish markedness paradox from a general typological perspective turns out to be a very economical case system at closer inspection of the syntactic distribution and functional load of the opposing case forms. | Roland Kiessling, 2007
  2. (Grammar) In these systems, there is overt coding on S and A. A marked nominative case system is one in which there are at least two cases, an absolutive (or accusative) covering the Object, and a nominative covering the Subject and Agent (as occurs with nominative/accusative languages). The marked nominative system is distinguished from other case systems in that the absolutive (or accusative) is the unmarked form and covers such functions as citation form, oblique and possessee as well as object. The nominative is the morphologically marked form. | Gerrit J. Dimmendaal, 2020

MARKEDNESS
(Phonology) A few different kinds of phonological asymmetry have been grouped together under the name "markedness". Marked segments:

  (Haspelmath 2006, Jakobson 1941)

 Traditionally, markedness has been treated as a subject for theoretical phonologists:

 In each of these cases, we're building formal markedness into our theory of mental representations. | Ollie Sayeed, 2022

MARKEDNESS CONSTRAINTS

  1. (Optimality Theory) These constraints enforce well-formedness of the output itself, prohibiting structures that are difficult to produce or comprehend, such as consonant clusters or phrases without overt heads. Markedness and faithfulness constraints can conflict, so the constraints' ranking—which differs from language to language—determines the outcome. | Kie Zuraw, 2002
  2. (Optimality Theory) These constraints evaluate output representations only, penalizing them for the presence of certain configurations.
     A typical example is the constraint NOCODA, which forbids the occurrence in the output of syllables ending on a consonant (a syllable-final consonant is often called a coda). Other examples include *VOI, which forbids the presence of voiced obstruents like [b, d, z] and so on, while being indifferent to the presence of their voiceless cognates [p, t, s]. Constraints may also be more specific in their demands; for example, there is good evidence for the existence of a constraint we can call *VTV, which has the effect of forbidding voiceless obstruents in intervocalic position: this constraint penalizes [opa] but passes on [oba] and [oa]. | Alan Prince and Paul Smolensky, 2002

MAX-ELIDE

  1. (Syntax) Or, Max Elide. The ban on deleting a smaller constituent in cases where deletion of a larger constituent is possible. | Hiroko Kimura, 2013
  2. (Syntax) Or, MaxElide. 
    MaxElide (Takahashi and Fox, 2005)
    Elide the biggest deletable constituent reflexively dominated by the [parallelism domain].
     | Troy Messick and Gary Thoms, 2016
  3. (Syntax) A condition (Merchant 2008) on ellipsis that ensures that larger ellipsis sites are chosen over smaller ones within precisely defined domains.
     The basic purpose of MaxElide is to account for English data like (1), which shows that VP-ellipsis is often not possible when sluicing is an option in the same clause.
    1. Mary was kissing someone, but I don’t know who (*she was).
     Building on an earlier version of Merchant 2008, Takahashi and Fox (2005) propose an account in terms of ellipsis parallelism, such that the constraint favoring the larger ellipsis site only applies in domains in which parallelism is satisfied, called parallelism domains (PDs). The basic content of the theory is given in (2)–(3), and the constraint is given in (4) (from Hartman 2011).
    1. For ellipsis of EC [elided constituent] to be licensed, there must exist a constituent (the PD), which reflexively dominates EC, and satisfies the parallelism condition in (3).
    2. PD satisfies the parallelism condition if PD is semantically identical to another constituent AC, modulo focus-marked constituents.
    3. MaxElide
      Elide the biggest deletable constituent reflexively dominated by the PD.
     According to (2)–(3), ellipsis only applies within a PD, and the PD can be either the same as the EC or some larger constituent that contains it. | Gary Thoms, 2014
  4. (Syntax) Example:
    1. ?? Ben knows who she invited, but Charlie doesn't know who she invited t.
    2. Ben knows who she invited, but Charlie doesn't know who she invited t.
     | Audrey Li and Tingchi Wei, 2023

MAXIMAL PROJECTION

  1. (Syntax) Those constituents in X-bar theory that are projected to the highest level and therefore are phrasal categories. For example, the noun phrase (NP) the road from New York to San Francisco is a maximal projection of the lexical item road. Similarly, from New York is a maximal projection of the preposition from, and to San Francisco is a maximal projection of to.
     In general, category X-phrase is a maximal projection of X, when X is dominated by X-phrase and no other Y-phrase stands between X and X-phrase. That is to say, every Y-phrase which dominates X also dominates X-phrase. Thus the above NP is a maximal projection of the noun road, but not of San Francisco, because the prepositional phrase from New York stands in between New York and the complex NP. | Hadumod Bussmann, 2006
  2. (Syntax) Following X-bar syntax (see e.g. Jackendoff 1977), Marantz (1984) defines that the lexical categories Nouns, Verbs, Adjectives, and Prepositions are each heads of projected phrases: Nouns Phrases (NPs), Adjectives Phrases (APs), and Prepositional Phrases (PPs). While the phrases NP, AP, and PP are "maximal projections" of the lexical categories, VPs are defined so as not to be maximal projections. Verb is defined as a function from arguments bearing certain specific semantic roles to a VP, and a VP is defined as the constituent that takes an argument from a sentence. Thus the maximal projection of a verb is a sentence, not a VP. A VP, being a nonmaximal projection of a verb, acts as a function from an argument (usually the subject of the sentence) into a sentence. Thus VPs cannot be arguments of lexical categories because arguments of lexical categories are always maximal projections. | Tsutomu Matsunami, 2014

MAXIMAL PROPOSITION
(Semantics) There exist several approaches to semantic constructions where truth values are represented as being made up from some primitive components. For example, in some explications of Kripke models for intuitionistic logic, propositions (identified with sets of worlds in a model structure) can be understood as truth values of a certain kind. Then the empty proposition is interpreted as the value false, and the maximal proposition (the set of all worlds in a structure) as the value true. Moreover, one can consider non-empty subsets of the maximal proposition as intermediate truth values. Clearly, the intuitionistic truth values so conceived are composed from some simpler elements and as such they turn out to be complex entities. | Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing, 2011

MAXIMALITY
(Semantics) Involves reference to the maximal element of a certain set. The way maximality manifests itself depends on the algebraic structure of that set. Degrees are ordered linearly, and the maximal element of a set of degrees is therefore the highest degree in that set. In a set in which the elements are only ordered in a join semi-lattice, the maximal element is the sum of all the elements in the set. | Hotze Rullmann, 1995

MAXIMALITY THEORY
(Semantics) The so called Uniqueness Theory of singular definite descriptions is usually coupled with the Maximality Theory of plural definite descriptions, according to which a plural definite description denotes/refers to the maximal plural entity that satisfies the description (Link 1983, Sharvy 1980). This meaning is captured by the σ-formula in (2).

  1. The cats slept.
  2. SLEPT (σx CAT(x))
 Combining uniqueness and maximality in a unified theory is attractive because uniqueness is a special case of maximality: if there is exactly one entity that satisfies the description, it is also the maximal one. | Radek Šimík and Christoph Demian, 2020

MAXIMIZE PRESUPPOSITION!

  1. (Pragmatics) 
    Maximize Presupposition! (Heim 1991, Sauerland 2003)
    Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible.
     | Matthew Barros and Gary Thoms, 2023
  2. (Pragmatics) Heim (1991)'s "Maximize Presupposition!" is a principle of language use that forces speakers to sometimes use a sentence ψ rather than a competing sentence φ to update the context c when φ and ψ contribute the same new information to c. More specifically, if φ and ψ are competitors (in some well-defined class of competing elements), and ψ has stronger presuppositions than φ which are satisfied in c, and φ and ψ add the same new information to c, then the speaker must use ψ in c.
     For example, since it is common knowledge that there is exactly one sun, it is odd to say # A sun is shining; this sentence is "blocked" by its competitor, The sun is shining, which is a better candidate under Maximize Presupposition!.
     All formal statements of MP that I am aware of characterize it as a global constraint, operative at the root (e.g., Sauerland 2003, 2008; Percus 2006; Schlenker 2006; Chemla 2008; Magri 2009). | Raj Singh, 2010

MENTAL REPRESENTATION

  1. (Discourse) As people read a text, they form a mental representation of the information communicated in the discourse, which has been likened to filing the information into cognitive files. | ?
  2. (Syntax) A general goal of linguistic theory is to uncover the nature of the human language faculty by characterizing a set of computations that manipulate mental representations in order to produce natural language. | 34th Penn Linguistics Colloquium

MENTAL SPACES, THEORY OF
(Discourse) Develops in detail the notion of a complex, highly structured universe of discourse. The theory posits that, in general, the production and interpretation of discourse involves the construction of a succession of hierarchical configurations of "mental spaces" or cognitive domains. These configurations are constantly updated as the discourse progresses.
 Speakers and addressees determine the appropriate configuration of spaces in any given situation by taking into consideration grammatical clues, the previous discourse context, aspects of the immediate situation, general background knowledge in the form of frames, cultural models, folk theories, etc. The spaces themselves are mental models of discourse that are only very partially specified. They are internally structured, with individuals, roles, properties, relations, and strategies. A large number of spaces will be constructed over any stretch of thought, so individual spaces tend to be simple. | ?

MENTION-SOME

  1. (Semantics) Mention-some questions allow for multiple complete answers in the same world. Mention-some readings emerge in modalized questions, such as (1). Intuitively, (1) can be interpreted as asking the responder to name just one place we can get gas. Suppose that the places to get gas in w are Texaco and Shell. The question, then, can be completely resolved equally well with either answer.
    1. Where can we get gas?
      a. We can get gas at Texaco. (complete at w)
      b. We can get gas at Shell. (complete at w)
     | Aron Hirsch and Bernhard Schwarz, 2019
  2. (Semantics) Strikingly, wh-questions with an existential modal ("-questions") can be naturally responded to by a non-exhaustive answer (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984). For instance, question (1) can be perfectly addressed by answer (1a), which specifies only one of the chair candidates, and question (2) can be naturally addressed by answer (2a), which names only one nearby coffee place. Crucially, while being non-exhaustive, (1a) and (2a) do not have to carry an ignorance mark they do not imply an exclusive inference even if uttered with a falling tone. Following Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), I call these answers mention-some (MS) answers. Relatedly, readings in which a question calls for a MS answer are called mention-some readings, and questions admitting MS readings are called mention-some questions.
    1. (A's belief: Only Andy and Billy can chair the committee. Co-chairing is disallowed.)
      Q: Who can chair the committee? A: ...
      a. Andy. ⇏ Only Andy can chair the committee.
      b. Andy and Billy.
      c. Andy or Billy.
    2. (A's belief: There are two coffee places nearby, namely Starbucks and Peet's.)
      Q: Where can we get coffee around here? A: ...
      a. Starbucks. ⇏ Starbucks is the only coffee place around here.
      b. Starbucks and Peet's.
      c. Starbucks or Peet's.
     While tagged as MS-questions, -questions also admit mention-all (MA) readings in which they call for an exhaustive/MA answer. For example, (1) and (2) can also be addressed by listing all the chair candidates and all the nearby coffee places, respectively. Hence, we say that -questions are subject to a MS/MA-ambiguity. The MA answer to a -question can be conveyed either by a conjunction as in (1b) and (2b), or by a free-choice disjunction as in (1c) and (2c). | Yimei Xiang, 2020

Page Last Modified December 28, 2023

 
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